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Somewhat United: Primary Stakeholder Perspectives of the Governance of 
Schoolboy Football in Ireland 
Finnegan, L., McArdle, J., Littlewood, M., Richardson, D. 
Abstract 
Despite an independent report on the governance and organisational practices of football 
in Ireland, the National Governing Body continues to face criticism in relation to 
stakeholder management and communication. As positive outcomes in non-profit 
organisations are associated with quality relationships between organisations, the purpose 
of this article is to explore primary stakeholder perspectives of the governance of 
schoolboy football in the Republic of Ireland. The research questions to be addressed are: 
do tensions exist between stakeholders of football governance in the Republic of Ireland 
and does the FAI display effective governance behaviours in relation to its primary 
stakeholders (SFAI).   
This exploratory investigation of stakeholder management utilised purposive sampling, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven stakeholders from the football 
governance system. Content analysis used a deductive and inductive process.   
A lack of congruence across the system was identified, which resulted from ineffective 
stakeholder management (poor communication practices, perceptions of inaccurate 
disclosures, perceived lack of inclusion in decision-making, perceptions of organisational 
injustice, confusion over role clarity and responsibilities). Managing the quality of the 
relationships with diverse stakeholders within a sport governance system is key for 
strategic policy formation and implementation, yet this remains a challenging and multi-
faceted concept.  
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Introduction 
Following the 2002 World Cup campaign in Japan/South Korea, the Football Association 
of Ireland (FAI) secured the services of a Scottish based consultancy organisation (Genesis) 
to conduct an evaluation of the planning and organisational practices prior to and during 
the World Cup. Serious management, leadership and governance flaws within the FAI were 
identified by the Genesis review (2002). They reported that the FAI must accept a need for 
greater professionalism, develop effective voluntary leadership, professional management 
and structures. Organisational changes including the reduction in the number of board 
members, sub-committee formation and operational role-clarity were recommended, with 
a further recommendation that two independent “non-executive” directors be appointed to 
the board; a number of these changes remain unimplemented (Fallon, 2016). The Genesis 
report also cited that the FAI had poor and ineffective communication with stakeholders 
and that they failed to recognise good organisational practice employed elsewhere in sport. 
The FAI assert in their strategic plan for 2016-2020 that ‘governance is at a high level and 
will be maintained as such’ (p34, para 2) and they fully endorse best practice in governance 
(FAI, 2016). Yet the FAI still face criticism in relation to gender representation, lack of 
independent directors, age and term limits of board members and fiduciary transparency 
(Sweeney, 2017). 
Weak governance and scandals have seen sport organisations undergo reform to assess 
governance practices (Numerato et al., 2013; Parent & Patterson, 2013), with significant 
external pressures being placed on National Governing Bodies (King, 2017). Responding 
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to pressures to professionalise is a key compliance related challenge for organisations 
(Nichols, 2013), with eradicating executive-level power abuses and improving stakeholder 
relationships being cited as enhancing organisational effectiveness (King, 2017).  
After a thorough analysis of national level, non-profit sport organisations, stakeholder 
satisfaction was identified as being the ‘most consistent determinant of performance’ 
(O’Boyle & Hassan, 2014; p.307). A key consideration is that if a group can affect an 
organisations viability, then the primary objective for that organisation is to create value 
for stakeholders and to do this effectively they must focus on how value gets created for 
stakeholders (Freeman et al., 2010). Frooman (1999) identified how the behaviour of 
stakeholders and their management of relations with the governing organisation to achieve 
their interests has been missing from theory. There remains a dearth of knowledge about 
the overall functioning and interactions of networks of organisations (Chelladurai & Zintz, 
2015; Provan & Kenis, 2007) and resultant tensions or issues which can arise from such 
interactions (Bayle & Robinson, 2007).  
The FAI and the Schoolboy Football Association of Ireland (SFAI) are the primary actors 
and key stakeholders in youth development, yet their relationship has never been 
theoretically examined. With the Genesis report criticism on stakeholder relationships 
being conducted 15 years ago and the current insistence by the FAI that governance 
practices are at a high level, it is timely to instigate an exploratory study of the practices of 
the primary stakeholders in youth football and their relationship with the hierarchical levels 
of football governance within the Republic of Ireland. The purpose of this article is to 
explore primary stakeholder perspectives of the governance of association football in the 
Republic of Ireland.   
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Below, an overview of sport governance and specifically football governance is provided 
with a focus on stakeholders in this process, which is followed by a presentation of the 
theoretical framework and its multiple constructs and interpretations. Insights into the 
structure of football within the Republic of Ireland are presented to contextualise the 
current situation. Finally, research questions are presented.  
Sport governance 
Governance within a sporting environment is the process of granting power and managing 
and leading an organisation (O’Boyle, 2013). Therefore, governance is both administrative 
and political (King, 2017).  Shilbury, Ferkins and Smythe (2013, p.349) suggested that; “to 
govern is to steer an organisation, and to make decisions that are consequential, strategic, 
and impactful, usually on behalf of others”. Governance can therefore be about defining 
ends and controlling the means to achieve these ends (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Thus, the 
notion of ‘sport governance’ is wider than a single organisation and has been aligned not 
only to the governance of an organisation but also governance across a sport system 
(Shilbury et al., 2013) or the shift away from the direct control of a sport, towards its 
governance (Amara et al., 2005).  
A myriad of characteristics of non-profit sporting organisations have been identified which 
adds to the complexity of governing (Fishel, 2003; Watt, 2004). These include the 
dependence on volunteers for governance and delivery of services, complex structures 
accommodating many diverse stakeholders, tensions between paid and volunteer staff and 
the board, objectives that are difficult to quantify, potential domination by influential 
groups or individuals. Sport administrators may lack specific skills and competencies, thus 
often struggle to manage the increasing demands placed on sport federations for their 
effective management, which can lead to poor governance practices (Kartakoulls et al., 
2015). 
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Good governance is seen as being embedded within the context of the organisation’s 
economic activities and social relations both sitting in and with the wider society (Persson, 
2011) and refers to the ethical standards of these relationships (Henry & Lee, 2004). Nanda 
(2006, p. 272) refers to good governance as that which combats “corruption, nepotism, 
bureaucracy and mismanagement”, with good governance in practice imbuing the opposite 
of these terms (Persson, 2011). Governance is concerned with three key issues, how an 
organisation develops strategic goals and direction, how the board of an organisation 
monitors performance to achieve these goals and ensuring that the board acts in the best 
interests of the members (ASC, 2012).  
An effective sporting organisation should ensure that key stakeholders are consulted and 
involved in the development of strategic plans, actively involved in achieving the outcomes 
of the plan, well-informed and actively participating at its general meetings and regularly 
provided with timely and accurate disclosures on all matters regarding the governance and 
performance of the organisation (ASC, 2012). A role of NGBs is to meet the heterogeneous 
needs and expectations of stakeholders (Winard et al. 2010) and to create solidarity 
between such units (Bayle & Robinson, 2007). Utilising the input and expertise of 
stakeholders, establishing representation and democratic standards for communications 
and formalising the role, responsibilities and objectives of stakeholders is critical for 
effective sport governance (EU Work Plan for Sport, 2013). Formalising these roles 
‘promotes accountability and should assist in minimising the prospects of any party 
exceeding their powers, avoiding consultation on key decisions, duplicating resources 
and/or generating tensions associated with unbalanced policy or decision making’ (EU 
Work Plan for Sport, 2013, p.8). Where interests and objectives diverge, power is likely to 
determine the outcome (Pfeffer, 1997). The ‘top-down’ system of governance given way 
to a complex system of inter-relationships between stakeholders, each looking to exert 
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power and draw on alliances (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 28). The delegate system of 
representatives that usually comprise the board of a network sport system can be 
problematic in the sense that members may try to represent their local areas needs rather 
than a broader national view on the governance of the sport (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; Henry 
& Lee, 2004). Whilst facilitative regional relationships are a key aspect of organisational 
strategic capability (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2012) the impact of this system can lead to self-
serving motives being advanced. 
Football Governance  
The governance of football has been the subject of much academic debate over the past 10 
years (Garcia & Welford, 2015) with studies focusing on both overarching international 
football governance (cf. Geeraert & Drieskens, 2015; Strezhneva, 2016) and context 
specific research (cf. Hamil et al., 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2013; Liang, 2013). The traditional 
hierarchical model of football governance has been transformed. Historically sporting 
organisations retained a command and control, hierarchical approach to governance but 
due to external pressures there has been a move towards governance being managed 
through a network of horizontal structures (King, 2017). With the vertical channels of 
power undermined, stakeholder power is growing through these complex forms of network 
governance (Strezhneva, 2016) where it is the role of the NGB to ‘create solidarity between 
the units which make up its sport system’ (Bayle & Robinson, 2007; p.259).  
 Despite the organisational homogeneity of modern national football structures (King, 
2017; Relvas et al., 2010), there are certain contextual factors that influence stakeholder 
relations within these settings (e.g. culture, organisational structure) (Anagnostopoulos, 
2011; Senoux, 2008). Due to the increasing complexities of modern day football, 
negotiation and interaction between a multitude of members and organisations is needed to 
govern efficiently (Geeraert et al., 2012; Hamil et al., 2010; Sørensen & Torfing, 2005). 
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The fundamental task of an NGB is to ensure that member organisations follow established 
rules and regulations (Chelladurai & Zintz, 2015), thus the management of stakeholders is 
an essential part of football governance.  
 
Football Stakeholders  
Stakeholders in modern day football organisations can include shareholders, players, 
leagues and federations, local authorities, support associations, supporters, broadcasting 
companies, commercial, voluntary and public providers and EU regulatory authorities 
(Anagnostopoulos, 2011; King, 2017; Senaux, 2008; Stevens & Watkins-Mathys, 2006). 
Lack of time, patience and resources can limit the attention paid to these stakeholders by 
governing organisations (Cyert & March, 1992) thus a process of stakeholder salience 
identification can reconcile divergent interests of many stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
Mitchell, Angle and Wood (1997) identified three attributes of stakeholders that are key to 
identifying this stakeholder salience; power, legitimacy and urgency. Legitimacy implies 
that the actions of an entity are appropriate within social constructed system. Urgency adds 
a layer of dynamism to understanding the relationship, being “the degree to which 
stakeholder claims call for immediate attention” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p.867), while power 
refers to the extent that a stakeholder can impose its will on the relationship. Power and 
legitimacy constructs are distinct yet can combine to create authority in a setting (Mitchel 
et al., 1997). Despite being an important factor in non-profit football governance, 
stakeholder literature has mainly neglected ideas of power structures, abuse of power and 
power relationships (Fassin, 2012). 
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Stakeholder Power  
Slack and Parent (2006, p.199) define power as “ability to get someone to do something 
they would not have otherwise done”. Power has also been described as representative of 
social relations rather than an actor’s attribute and holds potential for influencing one or 
more other actors toward acting or changing in a certain direction (Emerson, 1962). 
Positive outcomes in profit and non-profit organisations are associated with high quality 
relationships between leaders, followers and organisations as a whole (Geertshuis et al., 
2015; Harris et al., 2011). Power is structural and arises from the relationships between two 
parties (cf. Mason & Slack, 2007; Walker & Hayton, 2017). The daily operations of any 
organisation may involve power struggles which can arise due to the diversity of opinions, 
goals and ideas of the various stakeholders involved (Soares et al., 2010). Contextual 
elements such as structures and resources can influence power within organisations 
(Doherty, 1998; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003). Within sport organisations, a primary way for a 
stakeholder unit to acquire power is by its ability to acquire and control resources (i.e. 
money, people, and information). The dependence of organisations on resources held by 
stakeholders gives leverage and power to those stakeholders (Frooman, 1999). The power 
to implement and the external compliance with, national initiatives has been cited as a 
potential issue within a federated governance system, as the sport governance system 
doesn’t operate as a top-down system, meaning that lower level organisations do not always 
fully comply with directives and policies proposed at the national level (Hoye & Cuskelly, 
2007).  
Stakeholder Communication 
With the Genesis report concluding that the FAI had poor and ineffective communication 
with stakeholders, it is crucial to assess what the outcomes of such ineffective relations are 
within sport governance networks. Representing stakeholders in decision-making, being 
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accountable and responsive to stakeholders in terms of decisions taken are key 
recommendations for NGBs (UK Sport, 2004). Unmanaged task and process conflict which 
can escalate and trigger relationship conflict can develop from a lack of communication 
(Hamm-Kerwin, 2010). Communicating to stakeholders is key in initiating any operational 
change within organisations (Tyler et al., 2013). Due to the voluntary nature of non-profit 
sporting organisations and the multiple levels involved, informal communication is often 
used which can lead to message confusion (Danylchuk et al., 2015), trust issues and the 
message being negatively influenced (Legg et al., 2016).  Communication problems and 
power imbalances between the units of a network governance structure are some of the 
leading causes of conflict within sporting organisations (Slack & Parent, 2006).  
Theoretical Framework 
Whilst the governing dynamics of a non-profit organisation can be viewed through the lens 
of stakeholder theory (Brown, 2002), little attention has been paid to the dynamics of 
stakeholder theory within sport governance of non-profit organisation (Ferkins & Shilbury, 
2015). Studies have been conducted from the perspective of sports clubs and NGBs on their 
relationship with stakeholders (Anagnostopoulos, 2011; Esteve et al., 2011; Wellens & 
Jegers, 2016) but rarely have the individual stakeholder perceptions been explored. To add 
to governance literature, stakeholder research needs to focus on what the stakeholders 
actually do and how they try to manage the governing organisation (Frooman, 1999).   
Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholder concept was introduced by the Stanford Research Institute in 1963, with 
the intention of broadening the notion of shareholders being the only group that 
management needed to be responsive to (Freeman et al., 2010). The theory gained 
momentum within academic and applied management spheres following the publication of 
Freemans (1984, 1999) work and became arguably one of the most prominent business 
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management theories to ever emerge from an ethical or philosophical viewpoint (Stieb, 
2009).  Advocates of stakeholder theory argue that organisations need to consider and take 
into account the range of individuals and groups affected by the work of the organisation 
(Stoney & Winstanley, 2001). Stakeholding can be seen as a matter of moral social 
conscience, where stakeholders are not seen as just a means to an end (Freeman, 1984) and 
thus should be incorporated into an organisation’s practices and policies (Freeman, 1984; 
Stoney & Winstanley, 2001). Freeman (2002) prompts a rethink of shareholder-centric 
management principles when asking “for whose benefit and at whose expense should the 
firm be managed” (p. 39).  
Confusion over; and varied practice within the field of the stakeholder concept has led to a 
multitude of interpretations, classifications and definitions (cf. Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Fassin, 2009; Kaler, 2002; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Philips, 2003; 
Senaux, 2008). Freeman (1984, p.46) defined stakeholders as “any group of individuals 
who can affect or is affected by the achievements of the organisation’s objectives.” 
Contemporary stakeholder theory emphasises the importance of mutual enrichment and 
nurturing rather than control or domination, which requires the primary organisation (i.e., 
FAI) to internalise the unique perspectives of its stakeholders (i.e. SFAI) to facilitate and 
promote growth within the organisation (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2005). Central tenants of 
the theory advocate redistributing benefits to stakeholders, redistributing key decision-
making power to stakeholders and bearing a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders 
(Freeman, 2002).  Cooperation and communication are outlined as key actions within 
effective stakeholder management, with Dunham, Freeman and Leidtka (2006) suggesting 
that management; 
‘ought to interact with other communities that it affects or is affected by, seeking to 
understand their perspectives, listen to their preferences, and evaluate the impact 
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of actions on them. Such interaction is best characterized as...cooperation…it 
ought to be in closer community with those upon whom it relies for support... It 
requires a more active pursuit. The firm’s interaction with these groups must 
be...collaboration’ (p.38).  
Opponents of the theory have critized the approach suggesting that it adds complexity to 
management by making firms responsible to a larger group of interested parties (Sundaram 
& Inkpen, 2004) and that including the voice of stakeholders compromised firm results due 
to negotiation needed to deal with competing interests (Blattberg, 2004). Freeman et al. 
(2010) attempt to address these concerns by emphasising that this approach is ‘about 
creating as much value as possible for stakeholders, without resorting to trade-offs’ (p. 28).  
Stakeholding is also cited to be instrumental in increasing economic measures such as 
efficiency and profitability (Campbell, 1997; Esteve et al., 2011; Kaserer & Moldenhauer, 
2008; Stoney & Winstanley, 2001). According to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (1999) decision-makers should recognise that the interests of 
organisations are served by recognising the interests of stakeholders and their contribution 
to the long-term success of the corporation. Involving stakeholders in the governance 
process can also act as a “psychological contract that binds the individual to the 
organization” (Stoney & Winstanley, 2001, p.609) suggesting greater levels of 
commitment to the organisation and thus preventing undesirable and self-serving 
behaviour. There exists a dichotomy of focus between two streams of stakeholder literature, 
those that focus on the potential returns for the organisation through accounting for their 
stakeholders, known as instrumental stakeholder theory. Those who hold a more altruistic 
view over such a utilitarian one and see stakeholding as the ‘right thing to do’, follow a 
moral stakeholder approach (Berman et al., 1999; Jones et al., 2007).  
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While stakeholders are affected by the governing organisation, they consequently can also 
affect the organisation, a salient concept of reciprocity that has been lacking in stakeholder 
theory literature (Fassin, 2012). Despite having responsibilities within a network 
governance system, the obligations and duties of stakeholders are rarely examined (Robins, 
2005). Fassin (2012) labelled stakeholders who have a genuine and legitimate stake in an 
organisation and strive for mutual benefits as ‘stakeowners’ (p.89). Three other 
categorisations of stakeholders are also presented, including stakewatcher, stakekeeper and 
stakeseeker, all with differing attributes related to legitimacy, power, loyalty, responsibility 
and reciprocity. Ferkins and Shilbury (2015) introduced this concept to sport governance 
literature, whilst stating the need for future research into stakeholder responsibility and 
reciprocity within the non-profit governance sector.  
Irish Football Governance  
The Football Association of Ireland (FAI) is the national governing body for the sport in 
the Republic of Ireland. Youth development within Irish football begins within the 
structures of the Irish schoolboy leagues (governed by the Schoolboy Football Association 
of Ireland, SFAI, which is affiliated to its parent body, the FAI).  The SFAI receive funding 
from the FAI but also seek and receive sponsorship from independent sources to support 
its activities (Bourke, 2007). The organisation is governed by an Executive Committee and 
a National Council (see figure 1).  
Figure 1 near here.  
Under the umbrella of the SFAI, there are 32 individual leagues, spanning the 26 counties 
of the Republic of Ireland. These leagues are autonomous entities in relation to competition 
structures within their leagues, but act as a federation under the stewardship of the SFAI. 
In accordance with the SFAI rulebook (section 26), a ‘properly constituted’ league is one 
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which; promotes the game of association football and is governed by the rules of the SFAI, 
is governed by regularly elected officers and management committee, has the right to 
dispose of its own funds through the management committee and doesn’t report or disclose 
any of its business to any organisation other than the SFAI (SFAI, 2017). Each league has 
a representative on the National Council, with some leagues also having a seat on the 
Executive Committee. The FAI have reduced the voting power of the SFAI on the FAIs 
Council and continues to receive criticism about its lack of funding to the SFAI and 
underage football in Ireland (Murphy, 2015). The complex and fragmented nature of the 
organisational structure of football in the Republic of Ireland has frequently led to disarray 
and disagreement both within the SFAI, its associated leagues, clubs and its parent body, 
the FAI (Fallon, 2013). 
The SFAI can be seen as salient stakeholders within football governance in Ireland as they 
have power (due to their control over resources), legitimacy (as a formal sport governing 
authority) and urgency (can mobilise formal and informal communication channels if 
needed) thus according to proponents of stakeholder theory, merit managerial attention 
(Mitchel et al., 1997). 
Summary 
Stakeholder theory emphasises the need for cooperation and collaboration with 
stakeholders by engaging in a mutually beneficial relationship which advocates 
redistributing benefits to stakeholders, redistributing key decision-making power to 
stakeholders and bearing a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders (Freeman, 2002). It is 
impossible to isolate organisations from their stakeholders; indeed, the multiple 
relationships must be enriched as these interconnections constitute the very existence of 
the organisation (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2005). The Genesis report outlined that 
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organisational changes by the FAI were needed for coherent football governance, primarily 
related to communication with stakeholders.  
The purpose of this article is to explore primary stakeholder perspectives of the governance 
of association football in the Republic of Ireland and to examine operational practices and 
difficulties for a National Association in relation to stakeholder management. The research 
questions to be addressed in this article are as follows, does tensions exist between 
stakeholders of football governance in the Republic of Ireland and if so, what is the basis 
for such tensions? Does the FAI display effective governance behaviours towards its 
primary stakeholders, from the perspective of these stakeholders?  
Methods 
Research design 
This research followed a social constructivist approach which assumes that reality is 
constructed through interactions of phenomena related to an interplay between history and 
culture (Guba & Lincoln, 2004). Due to the exploratory nature of the approach, a single 
case, qualitative methodology was deemed most appropriate (Creswell, 2013; Sekaran, 
2003) as it allowed the researcher to go beyond descriptions and attempt to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the complex relationships being explored (Anyan, 2013) in a context-
specific setting (Patton, 2002). Semi-structured interviews were selected as they are a 
commonly used method of collecting data in qualitative social research methods (Holstein 
& Gubrium, 2004).  
Participants   
The sample (n=7) consisted of three members of the SFAI Executive Council and four 
League Secretaries and National Council members. Participants were selected using a 
purposive sampling strategy, this supports the use of smaller sample size numbers as it 
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ensures richness of data in terms of the diversity and characteristics of views that the 
sample represents (Patton, 1990; Ritchie et al., 2014). If the selected participants possess a 
level of expertise within the cultural context, then small samples can be sufficient in 
generating reliable data sets (Romney, Batchelder, & Weller, 1986). Richness of the data 
was ensured by selecting appropriate participants with an in-depth knowledge of the topic 
area and embedded within the relevant cultural context. The researcher followed guidelines 
from Ritchie et al. (2014) in designing a purposive sample which included identifying the 
framework of variables to include and prioritising the selection criteria used. Criteria 
included holding a position on the identified governance rungs (figure 2), with 
geographical diversity and age spread also being prioritised when selecting participants to 
contact.  
Due to the exceptionally small pool of people that have been members of the SFAI 
Executive Council, anonymity assurances were given to participants and numbered 
acronyms based on their organisation are used throughout to protect their identity. 
Conversely, Singleton and Strait (1999) argue that complete anonymity is impossible to 
achieve in social science research. As historical and contextual factors and information are 
important in social constructivist qualitative research, the researcher will attempt to provide 
as much background information as possible whilst ensuring that micro-aggregation of data 
and thus identifying individual participants does not occur (Clark, 2006). The following 
alphanumeric system was used to attribute respondents’ quotations in the Results and 
Discussion section; ‘EC’ 1-3 represent respondents from the SFAI Executive Council and 
‘LS’ 4-7 represent respondents from League Secretaries.   
Figure 2 near here 
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Procedure  
Ethical approval was sought and granted by Liverpool John Moores University. Following 
the purposive sampling procedures, participants were contacted via email and provided 
with an overview of the study. In total, 11 SFAI members were contacted, 4 didn’t reply to 
the initial email or provide any feedback on their lack of involvement. The interview guide 
was deductively developed using previously generated key research elements (Table 1). 
All interviews were conducted by the same researcher who was experienced in qualitative 
methodology, which standardised the interview process (Patton, 1990). These interviews 
were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. The interviews ranged from 68 to 119 
minutes in duration (M= 83 minutes). A clear paper-trail of the anonymization strategy was 
maintained, which consisted of original transcriptions, anonymity numbering systems and 
labelled codes being located separately (Clark, 2006).  
Table 1 near here  
Data Analysis  
Credibility depends more on the richness of the data and the analytical abilities of the 
research team than on sample size (Patton, 1990). The primary researcher is from Ireland 
and has played underage football in Ireland but didn’t have pre-existing personal 
knowledge of the participants included in this research. The secondary research team had 
no experience of underage football within Ireland but had experienced underage football 
in a different country and added a wealth of qualitative research experience. Constructivism 
values multiple realities, thus to acquire valid and reliable interpretations of such realities, 
multiple methods of examining data are required (Golafshani, 2003). The secondary 
research team aided the reflexivity of the process by providing ‘triangular consensus’ or 
general agreement regarding the reality being constructed, throughout the analysis 
procedure (Gould, Jackson, & Finch, 1993, p.137; Hill et al., 2005; Rennie, 2004) with any 
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differences being resolved by in-depth discussion and negotiated consensus (Bradley et al., 
2007). 
Content analysis used both a deductive and inductive process, which saw the incorporation 
of contextual analysis after theoretical data had been collected and analysed (Meyer & 
Wagner, 1998). Using primary themes derived from stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1999) 
to form an organising framework for codes, the content analysis continued with a line-by-
line review of the data, clustering quotes around identified themes. Along with these 
conceptual codes, relationship codes (links among conceptual codes), participant 
perspectives and characteristics code types (age, geographic location, paid/unpaid position) 
were also utilised (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Bradley et al. 2007) which facilitated analysis across participant roles (Ivankova, 
Creswell, & Stick, 2006) and allowed for greater insights and overall contextual analysis. 
Data which was not coded under this framework was identified and subsequently analysed 
to determine if they represented a new category (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) with the purpose 
of this being to identify if this inductive approach could derive new insights (Legg et al., 
2016).    
While individual participants remained anonymised, as much as possible, the context is 
made available for analysis to understand the networks and relationships at play (Clark, 
2006). This was done by the author providing the reader with a background to football in 
Ireland, the current roles of the organisations involved in the governance of football, their 
historical engagements and interactions and significant events (i.e. Genesis report). Quotes 
are used to display results to emphasise and retain individual uniqueness (cf. Morrow & 
Smith, 1995). 
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Results and Discussion 
The SFAI has been identified as the primary stakeholder in this analysis of schoolboy 
football governance as there is a high dependency on the SFAI (and its league affiliates) 
by the FAI in relation to providing league structures, providing competition structures and 
initial access to coaching resources. This lends importance to seeking and exploring their 
views due to the potential influence that they could yield in relation to the governance of 
football. Findings within this section are constructed around the following research 
questions; Do tensions exist between stakeholders of football governance in the Republic 
of Ireland and if so, what is the basis for such tensions? Does the FAI display effective 
governance behaviours in relation to its primary stakeholders (SFAI), from the perspective 
of these stakeholders? 
1. Do tensions exist between stakeholders of football governance in the Republic 
of Ireland and if so, what is the basis for such tensions? 
Histories of conflict and antagonism and minimal mutuality between bodies have been 
identified as adversely impacting on the governing of such networks (O’Boyle & Shilbury, 
2016), as outlined by LS5 “there are historical grudges and clashes, they affect everything 
other bodies try to do”. This conflict was outlined by EC2 “I think it’s a pity that there are 
people in school-boy football who call the FAI 'they'. When they should be saying we, not 
they and them”. Stemming from “traditions”, with the governing body “being entrenched 
in 100-year-old systems” (EC1), all participants stated that poor relations between the units 
of football governance hampered strategic management and progression of the sport. 
Views on the FAI differed significantly across various sections of the SFAI structures, 
which is not unusual within governance research, with Inglis (1997) noting that different 
positions within an organisation can bring differing perceptions of the importance and 
performance of governing body board; “I’d prefer that we break away from them [FAI] 
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entirely, what do they do for us?” (EC3), “The FAI should be more proactive in their 
involvement in schoolboy football, they have the expertise, and the clout with UEFA to 
force change, I’d welcome that” (LS4). LS5 demonstrated an individualistic perspective 
from that league, continuing that he “‘didn’t know how tensions had developed” between 
bodies; 
Personally, I don't care who we get support from, whether it's the FAI or 
SFAI, whoever, I don't have any interest in these politics, old school- 
rows, let them get on with it they can sort it out (LS5) 
There have been several potentially latent preconditions to conflict between organisations 
identified within governance literature, for example leadership behaviours, power 
struggles, group composition and diversity and poor communication (Jehn, Northcraft, & 
Neale 1999; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999; Robbins, 1997). The primary causes for 
tensions felt by the stakeholder group in this exploratory study were governance issues 
related to the leadership apex of the NGB (governing actions, communication, perceptions 
of injustice) and resource issues (financial and human).   
NGB leadership 
From clubs and leagues a lot of the attention surrounding the FAI focused on its CEO, who 
is a ‘pivotal player’ in developing board capability (Ferkins, Shilbury & McDonald, 2009, 
p.271); “When [the CEO] came on board first I thought he was doing a great job, he has 
done some marvellous things. Like everything else, he just got too powerful and we feel 
ignored” (LS5), “[The CEO] tries to be all things to all people in football” (CS8). The 
primary actor (i.e., CEO) often develops a level of ‘recreational pluralism’ as he must 
maintain multiple types of relationships with a number of actors within the governance 
processes, developing multiple identities as a result (Shipilov et al., 2014, p.449). This 
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position was highlighted by LS5 when he identified that the CEO “tries to be friends with 
everybody, eh and I think maybe slowly but surely he's finding out that he can't be”. The 
ability of the CEO to network is recognised as a key political skill in influencing tactics 
and moderating outcomes (Ferris et al., 2007). Ferkins, Shilbury and McDonald (2005) 
identified a tension between a CEO who should be focused on maximising commercial 
opportunities for the organisation balanced with the boards’ recognition of remaining 
grounded in ‘community sensibilities’ which reflect the requirements of the wider members 
(p.218). Perceptions of the CEO seemed to be a subjective concept across the SFAI 
membership influenced by recent dealings, historical perceptions and personal impacts, 
these varying perceptions highlight the complexity of CEOs maintaining a positive image 
(Lock, Filo, Kunkel, & Skinner, 2013). The difficulty for the FAI in maintaining a positive 
working relationship with the SFAI and its federation of leagues is that the various 
stakeholders “differ in the criteria they use to evaluate the effectiveness of an organisation” 
(Herman & Renz, 1997, p. 187). This is a key consideration in this case as there were 
different opinions by SFAI members on the FAI and its leadership, management and 
effectiveness and indeed relevance. What complicates these relationships further is that 
these views may change over time depending on interactions and experiences of the 
stakeholders with the organisation and its members. This was acknowledged as being an 
issue within the SFAI by the Executive Council, ‘The SFAI Executive committee faces all 
sorts of administrative, disciplinary and other issues in a season and while their decisions 
are deliberate the reaction depends entirely on the receiver and many react in a political 
way’ (EC 2). 
Financial tensions 
The FAI fund the SFAI to cover administration costs and provides funds in grant format 
for its 32 leagues. The monetary value of these grants was seen as extremely low by the 
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SFAI, with one league secretary referring to it as “window dressing… we look after over 
half of all players playing football in this country and that’s all we receive” (LS4). Along 
with concerns raised about the extent of the funding, league secretaries and executive 
council members also voiced concerns regarding the lack of accountability that the FAI 
maintain over this spending. Barney (2011) outlines that a goal for the governing 
organisation should be to create a positive ratio between tangible outcomes received and 
resources given (i.e. time, effort) by stakeholders. In football these can take many forms 
“some people would do anything to put their bum on a plane and a free trip or a free dinner 
or a free drink” (EC3). NGBs are expected to meet a variety of expectations from an 
assortment of stakeholders, which tends to influence objectives and resource allocation 
(Winand et al., 2010). 
Funding withdrawal was used by the NGB as a potential threat over incongruent behaviour 
and actions, “the FAI will say things like ‘we’ll take your funding’, my answer to that is 
let them” (LS7), with some members believing that it reduced their autonomy and 
undervalued the work of volunteers within underage football. Other members preferred to 
remain unpaid as they felt it gave them more autonomy versus paid colleagues: 
[FAI senior staff member] has an old principle which is that he believes 
that if you pay someone to do a job they'll do it better than the volunteer. 
I personally don't believe that…. I would say it’s possibly because that 
would give the organisation control over us (EC4). 
 The tension between autonomy and interdependence is a central tenant of power relations 
(Emerson, 1962). Usually this discretion over the allocation of resources can create a level 
of dependency with other stakeholders which creates a major source of power for the 
resource awarding organisation (Ma, Rhee, & Yang, 2013), in this case the FAI. A common 
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observation across the network of stakeholders was that the FAI were struggling financially 
so the notion of financial dependency and the automatic power of the FAI is reduced within 
this case. This perception of the FAI has affected relations between the FAI and its network 
of affiliates; “I sent back word saying that I wouldn't have anything to do with the FAI as 
they owe us money so we are now not participating in anything to do with them” (LS7). 
Lack of organisational justice  
Organisational justice has been defined as perceptions of fairness and how this impacts on 
behaviour within organisations (Moorman, 1991) and has been linked to both 
organisational productivity (Heponiemi, Elovainio, & Laine, 2007) and commitment 
(Cihangiroglu, 2011). Fairness was identified as a key driver of stakeholder perceptions 
regarding its external relationships (Harrison & Wicks, 2013) with stakeholders who feel 
strongly about people being accountable and fair expecting the same from organisations 
(Brummette & Zoch, 2016). Primary sources of a lack of justice perception within this 
study were related to the FAI taking “our players” (EC 1) and developing unique alliances 
with one of the 32 SFAI leagues.  
Related to the incongruence regarding roles and responsibilities of the SFAI, some 
members of the SFAI felt that any attempt by the FAI to engage in policy related to players 
under 16 as “interfering with our players” (EC3). This differed from other SFAI members 
who welcomed even greater influence by the FAI onto policies related to player 
development; “they [FAI] need to go in strong and instruct the leagues that they must take 
part [in proposed player development policy]” (LS5)  The sport organisation (FAI) is the 
‘system controller’ in the talent development process and has responsibility for policy 
development within the sport (Pankhurst & Collins, 2013, p.91) yet an organisational 
context and culture that supports the integration of stakeholders into a shared vision and 
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belief for the future development and practices of the organisation is key (Gibson et al., 
2000).  
The federated nature of sport systems may significantly impact on the overall governing 
role due to the governing body not having complete control over decision making processes 
at all levels, resulting in lower levels of legitimate power. Within the SFAI, there was 
discontent regarding the relationship between one of the 32 leagues (Dublin District 
Schoolboy League) and the FAI. Financial aid provided by the DDSL to the FAI in funding 
its National Training Centre, prompted consternation amongst the Executive Council of 
the SFAI and the other schoolboy leagues regarding the nature of the alliance between the 
FAI and the DDSL. The DDSL providing funding to the FAI has blurred the lines of 
traditional vertical relationships between these organisations. With the outcome being that 
the other 31 leagues and the intermediary organisation (SFAI) have become uncomfortable 
with the power balance of the DDSL “There is far too much dependence on schoolboy 
football in Dublin” (LS6), which is consistent with Nierhoff and Moorman (1993) insight 
into perceptions of fairness influencing co-worker relationships. The schoolboy leagues 
question the ‘fairness’ of the dependency relationship. Money is a source of organisational 
power, and in this situation the parent body (FAI) is paradoxically relying on the sub-unit 
(DDSL) for financial aid which could complicate the power balance within the governance 
system. These interactions create social pressures for stakeholders to reciprocate with 
similar behaviour in subsequent matters, which perpetuates the cycle of incongruence 
(Mattingly & Greening 2002). Greenbery and Baron (2000) emphasise that avoiding 
unequal treatment between groups, promoting unbiased decision-making and providing 
effective feedback can enhance organisational justice with an organisation.  
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2. Does the FAI display effective governance behaviours in relation to its primary 
stakeholders (SFAI), from the perspective of these stakeholders?  
 
Stakeholder theory emphasises the need for cooperation and collaboration with 
stakeholders and engaging in a mutually beneficial relationship which advocates 
redistributing benefits to stakeholders, redistributing key decision-making power to 
stakeholders and bearing a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders (Freeman, 2002). In 
applied management, the mechanisms of effective governance may be described as acting 
in the best interests of members and considering the ethical standards of these relationships, 
formalising roles and responsibilities, utilising stakeholder input, developing effective 
communication, regularly providing them with accurate disclosures on all matters 
regarding the governance and performance of the organisation, (ASC, 2012; EU Work Plan 
for Sport, 2013; Henry & Lee, 2004). Perspectives on the FAI from within the SFAI will 
be assessed on these key concepts.  
Acting in the best interests of members 
Governance is concerned with how an organisation develops strategic goals and direction, 
how the board of an organisation monitors performance to achieve these goals and ensuring 
that the board acts in the best interests of the members (ASC, 2012). Perceptions of equity 
and feeling that concerns are addressed are key tensions in managing a network system 
(Provan & Kenis, 2007). The difficulty of delegate based board compositions which often 
self-serve rather than taking a broader view on governance, is that members may try to 
represent their local area needs rather than a broader national view on the governance of 
the sport (Henry & Lee, 2004; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007), “There's no doubt that there is a 
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lot of politics in Irish football, a lot of people looking after their green blazer brigade and 
looking after their own patch” (LS6). This is important when it comes to agenda setting 
which is a highly charged political process. Princen and Rhinard (2006) outline that the 
way policies are formulated and packaged has a strong bearing on eventual outcomes, 
which is why board composition and agenda setting power is highly charged and 
competitive. Independent members should be added to boards to allow for a broadening of 
the expertise of the group and to provide an independent voice to proceedings (Taylor & 
O’Sullivan, 2009). This lack of independent oversight on the FAI was noted by EC 1; 
“There is no communication whatsoever. The FAI go off and do their own thing”. 
Participants noted a culture of rumour regarding the future actions regarding the 
governance of schoolboy football by the FAI, “It’s like the fox looking after the hen coup” 
(LS4). The notion of organisational performance of an NGB is multi-dimensional, 
encompassing financial, social utility, economic, resource gathering and utilisation and 
sporting performance (Bayle & Robinson, 2007; Pferrer & Salancik, 1978; Winand et al., 
2010). This presents a dilemma to the board of management within an NGB which must 
balance competing interests and maximise often scarce resources to a variety of output 
indicators. The dichotomy between the economic performance of the organisation and the 
‘social good’ stakeholder voice was outlined by LS7;  
Their focus is on money. That is the biggest problem, they don't want to sit down 
and talk to the grass-roots people (LS7) 
Formalising roles and responsibilities 
 Within the SFAI hierarchy there existed discrepancies over their actual role within football 
governance. Some members highlighted their administrative function, ‘We oversee the 
leagues and the role of the league is of local governance and organising and supervising 
suitable competitions’. (EC2), whilst others identified a greater management and governing 
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role and future aspirations for the body, “Our overall goal is to control school boy football 
and run it and manage it. Someone has to manage it and we manage it well” (EC1), The 
governing role of the SFAI Executive Council was dismissed by League Secretaries, 
describing it instead as a “talk shop and a glorified cup committee” (LS7). Responsibility 
over the governance of football was unclear throughout the exploratory discussions, “we're 
the ones that run football, not the FAI” (LS7) with the EC 2 stating ‘we are a direct affiliate 
of the FAI, it’s the governing body. The FAI is God’. Chelladurai and Zintz, (2015) suggest 
that roles and responsibilities of each unit within a network governance context be 
reviewed to identify if restructuring or reorganisation of the individual units is required to 
reflect the functions of the apical NGB (in this case the FAI).  
Effective communication 
Apex organisations should facilitate the democratic process within the network of 
stakeholder organisations and oversee productive interactions among these organisations 
(Chelladurai & Zintz, 2015; Freeman, 1999). A lack of effective communication was noted 
as being present both within the SFAI and its constituent members and between the SFAI 
and the FAI. The closed nature of questioning allowed at the FAI AGM was highlighted 
by one League Secretary: “No-one is allowed to put a question at an AGM of the FAI. If 
you have a question you must put it in writing to them and they will tell you whether you 
can ask the question or not” (LS7). Communication is important as even if it initially 
doesn’t solve problems it does provide the foundations for effective problem solving in the 
future (Brunsson, 1989), with Pelled and colleagues (1999) noting that inter-personal 
tensions are diminished when team members interact with each other and engage in task 
debates. The fear often is that holding large scale collaborative arenas for discussion with 
stakeholders can release the perception of the governing organisation bowing to 
collaborative pressure and reducing its power perceptions (Pollitt & Hupe, 2011) with 
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control over information being used as a form of power (Pettigrew, 1972). This alternate 
voice aversion often occurs when there are social advantages to be gained from holding the 
role (Joshi & Fast, 2013). The disconnect between ‘them’ and ‘us’ from the varying 
hierarchical levels of the football governance system was evident, “they won't sit down and 
talk to us, the ones that know what’s happening on the ground” (LS6), this lack of empathy 
undermines the effectiveness of conflict and relationship management (Golman, 1998). 
Accurate disclosures 
Ineffective communication can lead to message confusion and trust issues amongst levels 
of governing networks (Legg et al., 2016). This was highlighted as an existing issue both 
between SFAI levels of management (Executive Council and Leagues) and between the 
SFAI and the FAI; “a lot of the floor of the SFAI wouldn't trust the Executive, wouldn't 
trust the top table”’ (LS5). Regarding recent prominent interactions regarding the proposed 
implementation of a national player development plan by the FAI, a League Secretary 
dismissed the accuracy of FAI senior staff in transmitting the message;  
‘We were at one meeting with [FAI official] and we were told a load of lies. They 
said they were given permission to bring in the ETP [development programme] age 
u11, the SFAI said that they were not, that there was a meeting being held. That's 
the sort of politics that you have going on there (EC1) 
Conclusion 
This study focused on the governance perceptions of primary stakeholders in schoolboy 
football (SFAI) on the governing organisation (FAI). Tensions exist across the system 
(both within the SFAI and outwardly to the FAI) based on leadership capabilities, financial 
tensions and a lack of perceived organisational justice. SFAI members encountered 
ineffective stakeholder management practices which included non-formalised roles and 
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responsibilities, ineffective communication, perceptions of not acting in the best interest of 
and inaccurate disclosures to, stakeholders which led to incongruence across the 
governance network.  
As this paper outlined an exploratory approach to examining the relationship between 
stakeholders in football governance, future research could extend this approach by 
providing concurrent analysis of both the governing body and stakeholder perceptions on 
governance approaches and by expanding the number of participants interviewed in each 
hierarchical rung.  Another limitation of this study was the reliance on semi-structured 
interviews. Mixed methods of data collection (e.g. document analysis, participant 
observation) could also be used to add objectivity and further insight into perceptions of 
ineffective governance behaviours.  
This study utilises stakeholder theory to examine relationships within a network, non-
profit, sporting governance structure. Freeman (1999) insists that the theory is practicable 
in applied settings. For a governing organisation to utilise the guiding principles of 
stakeholder theory for ethical purposes, economic efficiency or to develop psychological 
binds between the network of organisations involved in sport governance, it must consider 
the mechanisms required to overcome organisational inertia. The FAI need to assess 
current working relationships with each stakeholder group to develop congruence within 
the governance system, as the current state of incongruence, distrust and distain is unlikely 
to provide the platform for effective and coherent national policy implementation.  
Managing the quality of the relationships with diverse stakeholders within a sport 
governance system is key for strategic policy formation and implementation. Stakeholder 
typologies should be examined and all those involved in the development of coherent 
schoolboy structures be categorised to identify stakeholder salience. Appropriate practical 
managerial strategies should then be adopted which would maximise effectiveness and 
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minimise threats to governance (i.e. formalising roles and responsibilities, developing 
effective communication approaches, acting in the best interests of stakeholders and 
making accurate disclosures).  
It should be highlighted that equally, stakeholders can affect the organisation, indeed Fassin 
(2012) states that stakeholder theory has neglected the reciprocal nature of the relationship 
between organisations and stakeholders. Senaux (2008) outlined that “A good system of 
governance should then be one where managers take into account the interests of the 
different stakeholder groups (and have reasons to do so)” (p. 6). Effective stakeholder 
governance combined with the notion of stakeholder accountability begs the question of 
who should drive improved stakeholder involvement with schoolboy football in Ireland? 
From a normative perspective, a dual responsibility exists from the FAI as the nexus, apical 
organisation to take the SFAI into account yet also, for the SFAI as a salient stakeholder in 
the governance process to give the FAI a reason to do so. If the SFAI consider themselves 
as true ‘stakeowners’ in the governance of football, then there exists responsibility on their 
behalf to reciprocate responsibility, fairness and loyalty if that is the approach 
demonstrated by the FAI.  
This study adds to stakeholder management literature by focusing specifically on 
stakeholder experience through their lens which allows for a nuanced analysis of the SFAI 
perspective. Stakeholder groups are often presented as having homogenous opinions but 
focusing on a variety of views within the same group revealed multiple perspectives and 
inconsistencies. This is also relevant in relation to Fassin (2012) typology of stakeholder 
groups, where some members of the SFAI display categorisations of ‘stakeowners’ yet 
others display ‘stakekeeper’ and ‘stakewatcher’ attributes, thus adding complexity to 
stakeholder management approaches.  
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This study raises questions as to how the National Governing Body (FAI) can attempt to 
develop and maintain harmonious and productive relationships with their primary salient 
stakeholder group when such a group often hold incongruous opinions relating to the 
allegiance it should show to the governing body, the future of football governance, the 
importance of funding and their preferred communication channels, leaving the current 
approach to football governance only somewhat united.   
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